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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAURA LEE BLOXHAM FULLMER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BRIAN KEITH FULLMER, 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t . 
No. 870499-CA 
gory No. 7 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appea ls has a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h i s 
d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s m a t t e r p u r s u a n t t o U.| 
3 ( 2 ) ( g ) . 
C.A. Section 78-2a-
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final Order Modifying Decree of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in 
which the lower court modified the previously entered Decree of 
Divorce as to child custody, child support, 
and state tax exemptions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON AP 
alimony, and federal 
>EAL 
I. Did the trial court err when it ruled that there had 
been, since the time of the decree, substantial and material 
1 
changes in the circumstances upon which the previous custody award 
was based? 
I I * Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r when i t r u l e d t h a t the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s t r a n s i t i o n from p a r t - t i m e employment to f u l l - t i m e 
employment and the placement of the minor child in a day care 
cen te r c o n s t i t u t e d a change of c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
s u b s t a n t i a l and ma te r i a l to j u s t i f y reopening the question of 
custody? 
I I I . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r when i t r u l e d t h a t the 
remarriage of defendant, the non-custodial parent , to a ful l - t ime 
homemaker, c o n s t i t u t e d a change of c i rcumstances suf f ic ien t ly 
subs tan t ia l and mate r i a l to j u s t i f y reopening the ques t ion of 
custody? 
IV. Even had the t r i a l court cor rec t ly found tha t changes of 
circumstance ex is ted , did the t r i a l cour t e r r when i t awarded 
j o i n t custody of the ch i ld to the p a r t i e s and physical care , 
custody and control to defendant? 
V. Did the t r i a l court err when, in modifying the award of 
child custody, i t ruled that defendant should pay p l a i n t i f f the 
sum of $250.00 per month during the three-month summer v i s i t a t i on 
awarded to p l a i n t i f f ? 
VI. Did the t r i a l court err when i t set the previous award 
of alimony for review in one year? 
VII. Did the t r i a l court err when i t awarded defendant the 
1987 and 1988 federal and s t a t e income tax exemptions for the 
2 
minor child to defendant? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3) 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, 
or the distribution of the property as 
necessary. 
and dental care, 
is reasonable and 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final Order Modifying Decree entered 
after a trial on Defendant-Respondent!s Amended Petition to Modify 
and Plaintiff-Appellant!s Counter Petition tb Modify in the Fourth 
District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in which the lower 
court modified the Decree of Divorce signed by Judge David Sam on 
February 19, 1985. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
The Decree of Divorce in this matter wai originally signed by 
Judge David Sam of the Fourth Judicial District Court on February 
19, 1985 and became final three months late**, May 19, 1985. (R. 
22-23) In that decree, plaint iff-appe llant (hereinafter 
"plaintiff") was awarded custody of the minorf child, child support 
of $150.00 per month, and alimony of $200.00 |per month. The issue 
of tax exemptions was not addressed. 
Defendant-Respondent (hereinafter "defendant") filed his 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce in September, 1986, 
3 
requesting that child custody be awarded to him (R. 28), and his 
Amended Petition to Modify in February, 1987 (R. 62), requesting 
an elimination of alimony and an award to him of the state and 
federal tax exemptions. Plaintiff filed her Counter Petition to 
Modify in October, 1986, requesting an increase in the amount of 
child support awarded to her. (R. 49) 
Trial was held on October 13, 1987 before Judge Boyd L. Park. 
(R. 183) 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
After the trial on October 13, 1987, Judge Boyd L. Park ruled 
from the bench, finding: (1) that there had been material changes 
of circumstance, and (2) that he was entitled to consider the 
matter of custody. (R. 67) 
The lower court found that the following constituted a 
material change of circumstance: 
(a) The change in plaintiff !s work schedule to full-time 
employment, which had necessitated the placement of the minor 
child, Dagin, in a day care center on a full-time basis. (R. 195) 
(b) The remarriage of defendant and his creation, thereby, 
of a stable home environment where the child could be cared for by 
a stepmother who was a homemaker, not working outside the home, 
during those times when the defendant was working. (R. 195) 
Having found the necessary change of circumstances, the 
lower court made the following findings regarding the issue of 
child custody: 
4 
(a) That the minor child should dwell in a stable 
ovide better stability 
of the minor child at 
environment, and that the defendant could pr| 
and was in a better position to take care 
the present time. (R. 196) 
(b) That the plaintiff had less time available to spend with 
the minor child, as she was working full-time. (R. 199) 
(c) That there had been significant changes in the 
environment and goals of the plaintiff, and |that there had been a 
considerable degree of stability of th^ environment in the 
defendant. (R. 199) 
(d) That the day care center in which [the minor is enrolled 
appeared to be an excellent facility, but tl^ at the stepmother had 
developed an excellent loving relationship 
and would be available as a homemaker in the| 
by the child. The Court also found thatl the minor child had 
seemed to develop an excellent appropriate relationship with his 
stepsister. (R. 199) 
(e) That the custody of the minor child should be modified 
to award joint custody to both parties, with the actual physical 
care, custody and control being awarded to the defendant, and that 
the issue of child custody should be reviewed in one year. (R. 
195-196) 
(f) That the $200 per month alimony should not be presently 
discontinued, but that this issue should be Reviewed in one year. 
(R.196) 
with the minor child 
home at times needed 
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(g) That plaintiff should not pay child support to defendant 
at such times as he has custody, but that the defendant should pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of $250.00 per month during the three-
month summer visitation during which she shall have custody. (R. 
196-197) 
(h) That defendant should be awarded the 1987 and 1988 
federal and state income tax exemptions, as he was and is the 
primary care provider for the bulk of those tax periods. (R. 197) 
Conclusions of Law consistent with the above findings were 
prepared and filed with the Findings of Fact. (R. 200-202) The 
Order Modifying Decree awarded joint custody of the minor child to 
the two parties, with actual physical care, custody and control 
awarded to defendant. Plaintiff was not ordered to pay child 
support at such times as the defendant had actual custody of the 
child; defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff $250.00 per month 
during the three-month summer visitation period. The defendant 
was awarded the 1987 and 1988 federal and state tax exemptions. 
The previous award of alimony was not modified nor mentioned in 
the final Order, although the Findings of Fact indicated that the 
Court would review the alimony award in one year. (R. 204-206) 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 22, 1980 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1, 268) The only child of the parties, 
a son, Dagin Lester Fullmer, was born on May 19, 1983. (R. 1, 
255) Plaintiff filed her divorce Complaint on September 17, 1984 
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in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utih County. (R. 1, 254) 
The parties entered into an Amended Stipulation, which was filed 
with the court on February 19, 1985. (R. 10, 254) The Decree of 
Divorce, which incorporated the terms of the Amended Stipulation, 
was signed by Judge David Sam of the Foiirth Judicial District 
Court on February 19, 1985 and became fina 
May 19, 1985. (R. 22-23, 255-256) In that 
awarded custody of the minor child, child support of $150.00 per 
month, and alimony of $200.00 per month. The issue of federal and 
state tax exemptions was not addressed. (R. |22-23) 
Prior to the parties' divorce, plainttiff worked part-time, 
jl three months later, 
decree, plaintiff was 
At the time of the 
and attending school 
Defendant remarried 
and a child was born 
approximately three to four hours per day. 
divorce, plaintiff began working part-time 
from one to four hours per day. (R. 253) 
after the Decree of Divorce became final, 
approximately four months thereafter to defendant and his new 
wife. (R. 257) 
Defendant filed his Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce in 
September, 1986 requesting modification of zhe decree regarding 
child custody (R. 28), and later filed his Amended Petition to 
Modify in February, 1987 requesting modifiq 
regarding alimony and the state and federal 
62) Plaintiff filed her Counter Petition to Modify in October, 
ation of the decree 
tax exemptions. (R. 
1986 requesting modification of the decree rej 
child support. (R. 49) 
garding the amount of 
Plaintiff was served with the defendant's Petition to Modify 
Decree the night before she was to move to New York City with the 
minor child of the parties. At that time, she had moved out of 
her apartment in Provo and had sold or given away most of her 
furniture and belongings that required larger storage facilities. 
(R. 285) As plaintiff literally had nowhere to live, she and her 
child stayed temporarily with a friend in Provo, until they moved 
to Sunset, Utah, where plaintiff's parents took them in. (R. 285, 
290) The money she had saved for the move to New York City was 
used to retain an attorney. When she was financially able, she 
moved into her own apartment in Salt Lake City. (R. 285) 
At the time plaintiff was served with the Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce, she had terminated her part-time employment 
with the Brick Oven Restaurant in Provo in anticipation of her 
move to New York City. (R. 292) She then found part-time 
employment with Nelson Laboratories in Salt Lake City, where she 
made a gross monthly salary of $444.00. (R. 292, 83) During this 
time period, defendant made only sporadic payments of child 
support and alimony. (R. 286) For example, on May 22, 1987, when 
plaintiff signed her Affidavit for Pretrial, defendant was three 
months behind on his child support and alimony, which sum would be 
$1,050. (R. 75) 
Because she could not adequately support herself and the 
child on a gross salary of $444.00 per month, plaintiff began to 
work full-time, at the gross monthly salary of $950.00, for a Salt 
8 
Lake City law firm as a legal receptionist! 
1987, just a few months before the trial was held. (R. 156, 194, 
286) As a necessary result of this new 
child was placed in full-time child care at a day care center, 
during the summer of 
employment, the minor 
not far from her new 
also be available in 
;he age of five years. 
Tutor Time, in downtown Salt Lake City, 
employment. Kindergarten instruction will 
this facility when the minor child attains 
(R. 285) 
Since the time of the divorce and throughout t h i s l i t i g a t i o n 
defendant has been employed a t WICAT Systems, Inc . in Orem, Utah 
where he r e c e i v e s a monthly gross s a l a r y of 
does not work ou t s ide the home. (R. 142, 27 | ) 
T r i a l was h e l d on d e f e n d a n t ' s km 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Counte r P e t i t i o n on October 
$2,630.00. His wife 
ended Petition and 
13, 1987. (R. 183) 
Before the trial began, the attorneys met with the court in his 
that he had already 
350-352). Trial went 
chambers, whereupon the court informed them 
read the child custody evaluation report (R. 
forward with proffered testimony, and Judg^ Park announced his 
decision from the bench. (R. 315-326) 
Because the attorneys could not agree oh the language of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and final Order Modifying 
Decree, a further hearing was held on November 6, 1987, at which 
time the attorneys and the court went through a set of the final 
documents prepared by counsel for defendant. (R. 329-365) 
Counsel for plaintiff had marked her objections and proposed 
changes in red ink on the copies given the court. (R. 229-244) 
Discussion was held and ultimate modifications were ordered by the 
court. Plaintiff's counsel moved for a Rule 62, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Stay of Execution of Judgment which was denied by 
the court. (R. 361-362) 
The final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Modifying Decree were signed by Judge Park on November 10, 1987 
and entered in the court record that same day. (R. 193, 204) 
Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was also filed on November 10, 1987. 
(R. 208) 
Transfer of custody of the minor child did not occur, as 
plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Judgment of District Court Pending 
Appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The t r i a l cour t committed e r r o r when i t found t h a t (1) 
p l a i n t i f f ' s t r a n s i t i o n from part-t ime work and part- t ime school to 
fu l l - t ime work and the minor c h i l d ' s resu l t ing placement in f u l l -
time child care and (2) defendant 's remarriage const i tuted changes 
of circumstance suf f i c ien t ly subs tan t ia l to warrant the reopening 
of the child custody award. The change of circumstances on the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s part was not subs tan t i a l , and Utah case law c l e a r l y 
s t a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s r e m a r r i a g e was not a change of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e t o be c o n s i d e r e d in a c u s t o d y m o d i f i c a t i o n 
proceeding. 
The court compounded i t s error when i t considered the issue 
10 
of child custody de novo and found that th^ same factors used as 
changes of circumstance were also justifica tion for modifying the 
previous award of custody, giving joint custody to both parties, 
but awarding the physical care, custody and 
The court clearly erred when it ruled that 
control to defendant, 
a substitute mother, 
the stepmother in the instant case, would be highly preferable to 
any day care facility and the child1 s natural mother together. 
The court penalized the plaintiff for choosing to work full-time, 
even though the court acknowledged that sh& was forced to work 
full-time because of her finances. 
The court committed further error by 
justify its modification of the award c| 
plaintiff, by setting the previous alimony 
it found no change of circumstances with re 
failing to adequately 
f child support to 
award for review when 
bpect to alimony, and 
by awarding the 1987 and 1988 federal ajnd state income tax 
exemptions for the minor child to defendant, finding that in 1987 
he was the primary care provider because he paid $150.00 per month 
for child support. The court awarded him the 1988 exemptions on 
the assumption that the child would be livinlg with defendant most 
of the year. This matter was also set for review in one year, 
which was not necessary, in light of the! court's errors with 
respect to the custody award. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE 
HAD BEEN, SINCE THE TIME OF THE DECREE, CHANGES IN THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE PREVIOUS CUSTODY AWARD WAS 
BASED. 
The bifurcated procedure required by Utah case law in 
modification of custody actions is most clearly enunciated in a 
line of cases commencing with Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 
1982). In Hogge the Utah Supreme Court determined the bifurcated 
procedure involves (1) an initial decision that there are changed 
circumstances warranting the court's reconsideration of the 
custody award, and then (2) a subsequent decision as to the manner 
in which custody should be modified, if at all. Id . at 53. 
Unless the petitioner for a change in custody successfully carries 
the burden in establishing the changed circumstances, the trial 
court should not move on to a consideration of the custody issue. 
Step one of this bifurcated process itself becomes a two-
pronged process or test: 
[in] the initial step, the court will receive 
evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any 
changes in those circumstances upon which the earlier 
award of custody was based. In this step, the party 
seeking modification must demonstrate (1) that since the 
time of the previous decree, there have been changes in 
the circumstances upon which the previous award was 
based; and (2) that those changes are sufficiently 
substantial and material to justify reopening the 
question of custody. The trial court must make a 
separate finding as to whether this burden of proof has 
been met. If so, the court, either as a continuation of 
the same hearing, or in a separate hearing, will proceed 
to the second step. However, where that burden of proof 
is not met, the trial court will not reach the second 
step, the petition to modify will be denied, and the 
existing custody award will remain unchanged. 
12 
the parties attempted 
Id, at 54. 
In the instant case, the attorneys for] 
to lead the trial court through the bifurcated process. To that 
end both attorneys made "opening statements," (R. 254, 260) in 
which they proffered their evidence regarding the existence of 
changes of circumstances regarding child custody, as well as the 
other three issues in question, and argued! the case law dealing 
with that requirement. Despite the attorne 
of the evidence into the two steps, the trial 
finding at the end of this proffered evidencj 
circumstance, but rather allowed the coun 
commence presenting his case regarding all i 
After all evidence had been proffered 
trial court ruled from the bench regarding 
in circumstance, indicating that it was "not at all persuaded by 
the little nick picky things that have been brought up here and 
there." (sic) (R. 347) The trial court c| 
defendants alleged changes of circumstance: 
the mother has obtained full time employment 
ysT attempted division 
1 court did not make a 
e regarding changes of 
sel for defendant to 
ssues. (R. 268) 
by the attorneys, the 
the necessary changes 
result of that to place the child in a day care center despite how 
good that day care center is," further ex 
onsidered only two of 
(1 ) "[t]he fact that 
and is obligated as a 
plaining the court's 
belief that a day care center is "not a substitute for a mother in 
the home," and (2) "the fact that the petitioner in this case has 
remarried and established a stable home." (ft. 195* 317) 
The trial court, however, failed (and could not have, if it 
13 
had attempted) to relate these changes in circumstances to any 
part of the previous award of custody in the original decree of 
divorce, as required by Hogge. It was only in the first 
stipulation filed by the parties during the original divorce 
action that one of the parties—the plaintiff—was designated "a 
fit person to care for the physical and emotional needs of said 
child." (R. 8) The findings, conclusions, and decree prepared by 
plaintiff's original attorney failed to designate either party 
again as a fit person to care for the minor child. According to 
all three final documents, the plaintiff was simply awarded 
custody of the child. (R. 18-23) 
In order for the trial court to relate these two changes in 
circumstance to any part of the previous award of custody in the 
decree, the court would have had to find that plaintiff was 
originally awarded custody of the child because she only worked 
part-time, that the child had not been placed in a day care center 
and that the defendant had not yet remarried! Yet, the trial 
court found that plaintiff's full-time work, the child's placement 
in a day care center full-time, and the defendant's remarriage 
were changes of circumstance worthy of examining the custody issue 
de novo. 
Defendant would have had the court believe that, at the time 
of the divorce action, he understood that plaintiff would be the 
primary caretaker of the child and that "she would raise the child 
in her own home and he would pay her child support and pay her 
14 
alimony in response to the court's ord^r." (R. 269) This 
assertion by defendant flies in the face of all reality; 
certainly, he did not anticipate that she pould adequately feed, 
clothe, educate and house herself and their 
support and $200.00 alimony per month. 
proffered testimony regarding this understanding, the trial court 
did not refer to defendant's assertion in an 
any finding regarding this testimony. 
child on $150.00 child 
Despite defendantTs 
y way and did not make 
There was neither factual nor legal | 
trial court's finding that plaintiff's full-
placement in a day care center full-time 
remarriage were material changes of circums 
previous award was based. 
justification for the 
bime work, the child's 
, and the defendant's 
tance upon which the 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHE*J IT RULED THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S TRANSITION FROM PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT TO 
FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND THE PLACEMENT OF THE MINOR 
CHILD IN A DAY CARE CENTER CONSTITUTED A CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL TO 
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY. 
The second prong of step one of the Hogge analysis requires 
that the trial court find that the material changes of 
circumstance upon which the previous custodi award was based are 
sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the 
question of custody. The facts in the instant case simply do not 
justify the court's finding in this matter. 
Plaintiff's proffered testimony was 
parties' divorce, plaintiff worked part-time 
to four hours per day. (R. 253) Therefore, 
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that, prior to the 
L approximately three 
the child was already 
in some sort of babysitting arrangement or day care even before 
the parties1 divorce. At the time of the divorce, plaintiff began 
working part-time and attending school from one to four hours per 
day (R. 253), a small change in lifestyle which would have 
required slightly more time in day care for the child than during 
the marriage. Of course, during both these time periods and 
during all time periods since the decree was entered, the 
defendant worked full-time at his employment with WICAT and could 
not have provided personal, at-home care for the child himself. 
In finding that the plaintiff's full-time employment and the 
child's full-time enrollment in organized day care constituted a 
substantial and material change of circumstances sufficient to 
justify reopening the custody issue, the trial court failed to 
follow the guidelines found in Marchant v. Marchant, 66 Utah Adv. 
Rpt. 45 (September 18, 1987) for making adequate findings in a 
custody award. The Utah Supreme Court had previously held that 
the findings should be "sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), quoted in Marchant at 47. The 
Court of Appeals in Marchant understood this to mean that: 
a custody award must be firmly anchored on findings of 
fact that (1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include 
enough facts to disclose the process through which the 
ultimate conclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process 
is logical and properly supported, and (4) are not 
clearly erroneous. 
Id. 
16 
Since the trial court decided the custddy issue after finding 
ic findings regarding 
Marchant, should have 
substantial changes of circumstance, specif] 
the changes of circumstance, as required inj 
been made by the court. However, in the instant case, the trial 
court did not even attempt to so substantiate its findings with 
regard to changes in circumstance—either from the bench or in its 
written findings of fact. These finding 
conclusions without any basis in fact, or, are even simple 
assumptions made by the court. Nowhere 
either hearing can an explanation be found for the court's finding 
s are actually simple 
in the transcript of 
or conclusion that a transition from part-ti 
school to full-time work constituted a substantial change of 
me work and part-time 
found for the court's 
part-time babysitting 
circumstance. Neither can an explanation be 
finding or conclusion that a transition from 
or day care to full-time day care for th^ child constituted a 
substantial change of circumstance. It is obvious that there was 
no basis in fact for the trial court's finding regarding this 
change of circumstance. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN l(r RULED THAT THE 
REMARRIAGE OF DEFENDANT, THE NON-CUSTODjCAL PARENT, TO A 
FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER, CONSTITUTED A CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL TO 
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY. 
The Utah Supreme Court, relying on the 
Hogge, recently addressed the issue of changes of circumstance on 
behalf of the noncustodial parent in a child! custody modification 
procedure. In Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 62^ (Utah 1987), a fact 
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line of cases under 
situation existed which was remarkably similar to the instant 
case. The Kramers, during their divorce proceedings, had 
stipulated that the custody of the minor child should be awarded 
to Mrs. Kramer and that Mrs. Kramer was a fit and proper person to 
be awarded custody. Approximately 1 1/2 years later, Mr. Kramer 
filed a petition for modification of the award of custody, 
claiming that there existed the necessary changes of circumstances 
to warrant reopening the custody decree and transferring custody 
of the minor child to him. Id. at 625. 
Mr. Kramerfs evidence at trial included the following facts: 
he had obtained further education, a job with substantially 
increased income, a new home, and a new wife and a new child, and 
his wife and her two children from a previous marriage had formed 
good relationships with the minor child of the parties. He also 
alleged that Mrs. Kramer had a host of problems which made her an 
unsuitable mother. Mrs. Kramer's evidence contradicted Mr. 
Kramer's evidence regarding her suitability as a parent in almost 
every respect. Id . The trial court chose to believe Mrs. 
Kramer's evidence regarding her suitability as a parent. Id. at 
628. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court had 
correctly focused only on changes in circumstances affecting the 
custodial parent, rather than the noncustodial parent, when it 
found that Mr. Kramer had not successfully passed the first step 
of the Hogge two-prong test. The Court reviewed Becker v. Becker, 
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694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984) wherein, in int 
Hogge, the Court held that the first step 
requires that f,[t]he asserted change [in c 
some material relationship to and substanti 
ability or the functioning of the presen 
^rpreting and applying 
of the Hogge standard 
ircumstances] ... have 
al effect on parenting 
tly existing custodial 
relationship." Id. at 626, quoting Becker, supra, at 610, with 
emphasis added by the Court in Kramer. 
The Court further noted that, although in Hogge the 
noncustodial parent established a change ox circumstance on her 
part in order to pass the first step of the two-prong test, the 
facts of Hogge did not apply to Mr. Kramer.) In Hogge, the father 
was originally awarded the custody of the children primarily 
because of the mother's temporary inability to care for the 
children due to an "emotional illness." Therefore, the award was 
subject to a possible improvement of her emotional health. In Mr. 
Kramer's case, the Court found that the original award of the 
custody of the minor child to the mother was not conditioned upon 
any temporary circumstances on Mr. Kramer's 
Kramer firmly establishes that "ordilr 
circumstances prong of the Hogge test mus 
custodial parent," unless an exceptional fact situation, as in 
Hogge, exists. Such an exceptional fact situation does not exist 
in the instant case. IcL at 627. 
As in Kramer, the parties in the instant case originally 
stipulated that the custody of the minor chplld should be awarded 
part. Kramer at 626. 
narily the change-of-
st focus only on the 
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to plaintiff and that plaintiff was a fit and proper person to be 
awarded custody. Approximately 16 months after the decree became 
final, defendant filed a petition for modification of the award of 
custody, claiming among other changes of circumstances, that, 
because of his remarriage to a full-time homemaker, there existed 
the necessary changes of circumstances to warrant reopening the 
custody decree and transfer custody of the minor child to him, 
(R. 19, 26) 
Defendant's evidence at trial included the following: his 
income had substantially increased, he had a new wife and a new 
child, his new wife would provide full-time babysitting at home 
for the child of the parties, and his new wife and her child from 
a previous relationship (born after the defendant's remarriage) 
had formed a good relationship with the minor child of the 
parties. (R. 258, 276-277, 291) Defendant also alleged that 
plaintiff had some problems which made her an unsuitable mother, 
including allegations of instability, concern about the location 
of her apartment in Salt Lake City, her full-time work, the 
child's placement in a day-care facility, and alleged 
cohabitation, (R. 275-276) As in Kramer, plaintiff's evidence 
contradicted defendant's evidence regarding her suitability as a 
parent in every respect. The trial court in the instant case 
specifically limited its changes of circumstances to plaintiff's 
full-time employment, the child's full-time enrollment in day 
care, and defendant's remarriage. It did not consider the "nit-
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626. However, in the 
ipulation, findings of 
divorce that, at the 
picky" accusations of the defendant Regarding plaintiff's 
suitability as a parent. (R. 317) 
Defendants remarriage can only constitute a change of 
circumstances under Kramer if it fits the narrow factual exception 
found in Hogge—that the defendant was not awarded custody because 
he was temporarily incapable of caring for the child and that the 
award of custody was subject to or apparently conditioned upon an 
improvement in his circumstances. Kramer at 
instant case, there is no evidence in the st 
fact, conclusions of law or the decree of 
time of the stipulation of the parties, th& award of custody to 
plaintiff was subject to or conditioned upon an improvement in 
defendant's circumstances. To argue tha 
applies to defendant would be to argue that, 
not remarried and found a new wife before tjhe divorce action was 
concluded, he temporarily could not care for the child and the 
award of custody was conditionally given to plaintiff. Obviously, 
such reasoning is ludicrous and inapplicable 
stipulated that custody should be awarded 
she was a fit parent. Defendant clearly ddes not fall into the 
Hogge exception. 
Therefore, under Hogge, Becker, and Kramer, the trial court 
should not have considered defendant's remarriage a change of 
circumstance sufficient to warrant reopening the custody decree 
for consideration by the trial court. Th|ere was no evidence 
t the Hogge exception 
because defendant had 
The parties simply 
o plaintiff and that 
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presented that the remarriage of the defendant had a material 
relationship to and substantial effect on the plaintiff's 
parenting ability or the functioning of the existing custodial 
relationship. Becker at 610. The trial court erred in relying 
upon defendants remarriage as a change of circumstance, and the 
trial court should have never moved on to the second step of the 
Hogge analysis: the reconsideration of the custody award. 
IV. EVEN HAD THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
CHANGES OF CIRCUMSTANCE EXISTED, THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY 
ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED JOINT CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO THE 
PARTIES AND PHYSICAL CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL TO 
DEFENDANT. 
Hogge dictates that, if the trial court does find that the 
moving party has successfully carried the burden of establishing 
the necessary changes of circumstance, the court 
must consider the changes in circumstance along with all 
other evidence relevant to the welfare or best interests 
of the child, including the advantage of stability in 
custody arrangements that will always weigh against 
changes in the party awarded custody. The court must 
determine de novo which custody arrangement will serve 
the welfare or best interests of the child, and modify, 
or refuse to modify, the decree accordingly. 
Hogge at 54. 
After finding that material and substantial changes of 
circumstances existed, the lower court made the following findings 
regarding the issue of child custody: 
(a) That the minor child should dwell in a stable 
environment, and that the defendant could provide better stability 
and was in a better position to take care of the minor child at 
the present time. (R. 196) 
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(b) That the plaintiff had less time Available to spend with 
the minor child, as she was working full-time, (R. 199) 
(c) That there had been significant changes in the 
environment and goals of the plaintiff, and 
considerable degree of stability of th 
defendant. (R. 199) 
that there had been a 
b environment in the 
(d) That the day care center in which the minor was enrolled 
appeared to be an excellent facility, but that the stepmother had 
developed an excellent loving relationship with the minor child 
and would be available as a homemaker in th4 home at times needed 
by the child. The Court also found that the minor child had 
seemed to develop an excellent appropriate (relationship with his 
stepsister. (R. 199) 
(e) That the custody of the minor child should be modified 
to award joint custody to both parties, with the actual physical 
care, custody and control being awarded to tpe defendant, and that 
the issue of child custody should be reviewed in one year. (R. 
195-196) 
The trial court appeared to place grealt emphasis on factors 
(2) and (4) of the four factors set forth i|n Pusey v. Pusey, 728 
P.2d 117, (Utah 1986): 
(1) identity of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage, (2) the identity of the pareht with greater 
flexibility to provide personal care for the child, (3) 
the identity of the parent with whom th^ child has spent 
more of his or her time pending custody (determination if 
that period has been lengthy, and (4) phe stability of 
the environment provided by each parent. 
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Id, at 120. 
Again, the trial court failed to follow the rules of Marchant 
v. Marchant, supra, in making its findings in a custody award. 
The court's findings are not sufficiently detailed and do not 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusions on each factual issue were reached. However, 
the trial court's comments at the end of the trial clearly 
indicate that its reasons for awarding the physical care, custody 
and control of the child to defendant were exactly the same as its 
reasons for finding the changes of circumstance: (1) the change in 
plaintiff's work schedule to full-time employment, which had 
necessitated the placement of the minor child, Dagin, in a day 
care center on a full-time basis, and (2) the remarriage of 
defendant and his creation, thereby, of a stable home environment 
where the child could be cared for by a stepmother who was not a 
horaeraaker, not working outside the home, during those times when 
the defendant was working. (R. 195) Each finding listed above is 
"part and parcel" of the changes of circumstance found by the 
trial court and relates to factors (2) and (4) from Pusey: (2) the 
identity of the parent with greater flexibility to provide 
personal care for the child, and (4) the stability of the 
environment provided by each parent. 
In Marchant v. Marchant, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals 
dealt specifically with child custody awards and women who must 
work. In Marchant the trial court found that it was in the best 
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interests of the children for custody to be awarded to the 
defendant (the father). The court found 
living under which the mother had been resi 
that the standard of 
ding with the children 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, was "not what it should have been nor was 
Marchant at 46. In 
lifestyle had changed, 
t to the exclusion of 
her employment in Salt 
it in the best interests of the children."! 
addition, the court found that the mother's 
pursuant to her desires "and for her benefj^ 
the family unit." This was a reference to 
Lake City. Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held thit the trial court's 
findings were "flavored with bias against divorced women, an urban 
environment, and women who pursue other than the traditional role 
that the trial court 
standard of living in 
of homemaker." Id. The Court also noted 
appeared, when it referred to the mother's 
Salt Lake City and her change in her lilfestyle, to apply a 
"nebulous, higher standard ... to mothers seeking custody of their 
children in a divorce action." Id. The Court specifically 
addressed the mother's interest in "improving her ability to earn 
a living," stating that "this Court will not condone any finding 
of fact which might be interpreted as peq 
acquiring skills in other than the mo 
traditional areas necessary for functioning a^s a wife and mother." 
i 
Id. at 48. 
The trial court in the instant case did, indeed, apply a 
"nebulous, higher standard" to the plaintiff(mother in this case. 
alizing a woman for 
tst fundamental and 
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In its comments following the announcement that the court had 
found changes of circumstance, the court noted that no day care 
center could be a substitute for a mother in the home — in this 
case, the mother in the home being the stepmother. In the same 
breath, the court "gave" plaintiff credit for "wanting to and 
having to virtually go out and find full time employment." (R. 
347, emphasis added) Under this reasoning, plaintiff could have 
never successfully retained custody of her child in this lower 
court. She was forced, due to her minimal salary of $444.00 and 
the defendant's sporadic child support and alimony payments, to 
find a full-time job and place her child in full-time day care. 
Yet, because defendant had remarried (thereby obtaining full-
time, at-home day care) and had refused to timely pay his 
obligations to his former wife, thereby forcing her into full-
time work, he successfully sought and won the physical care, 
custody and control of the parties1 minor child! It did not 
matter that he was not available full-time in the home to care for 
the child. Apparently, plaintiff's only salvation would have been 
speedy remarriage to a man capable of supporting her and her child 
on his salary alone. 
It readily appears that the trial court did, indeed, penalize 
the plaintiff "for acquiring skills in other than the most 
fundamental and traditional areas necessary for functioning as a 
wife and mother." Id. at 48. Because she could not afford 
financially to stay at home with her child, and she was forced to 
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step out of the fundamental and traditional areas of a wife and 
mother to join the full-time work force, the trial court awarded 
the child to defendant; however, the courj 
actuality, an award of custody to defen 
stepmother of the child in question, w 
spending far more time with the child than would the defendant, 
who travels as part of his employment. Fur 
Court noted in Hogge that the "extent to 
parent could care for the child personal 
t's award was, in all 
dant's new wife, the 
no would actually be 
Jther, the Utah Supreme 
which each contesting 
ly is an appropriate 
consideration for the court." Hogge at 56, r 
Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 (Utah 1981) (emphas 
did not include stepparents as parties 
awarding custody, as did the trial court 
Plaintiff lost physical custody of her child, not because 
jeferring to Lembach v. 
is added). The Court 
to be considered in 
in the instant case. 
with the child, but 
titute mother who, in 
defendant could personally spend more time 
because defendant provided a full-time subsll 
the trial court's opinion, would be better than any day care 
center and the child's natural mother added together. 
The trial court, although clearly indicating its distaste for 
day care centers or preschools, never found that the child had 
been adversely affected in any way by his rime spent at the day 
care center. There was no expert finding that the child had been 
harmed by enrollment in full-time day care 
expert testimony that day care centers are harmful, per se. 
Instead, the trial court testified itself as to the lack of 
, nor was there any 
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stability for children in day care centers during its comments 
after the presentation of the proffered evidence: 
I appreciate day care centers. I appreciate preschools. 
My daughter runs one, she has her own. I know how she 
loves those kids, but I don't think she is a substitute 
for the mother in any fashion, no matter how caring she 
is. I think that is true of any that I have been 
acquainted with and any that are in existence. They are 
primarily a money making situation. They do care and 
they do love. It cannot radiate the stability that is 
necessary in a child's life. (R. 319-320) 
The classic irony of the court's statement regarding day care 
centers as "money-making situations" is that plaintiff's 
unrebutted proffered testimony was that, before the current court 
action began, when defendant and his new wife took care of the 
parties' minor child, they required plaintiff to pay them the 
normal babysitting fees she would have paid any other babysitter. 
(R. 264-265) When plaintiff babysat for defendant during his 
summer visitation with the child immediately prior to his 
remarriage, plaintiff charged him nothing for her babysitting 
services. (R. 263-264) 
In the second hearing held November 6, 1987, the court 
further stated his opinion regarding day care centers: 
What I am concerned with and still am concerned about is 
stability of an environment I just don't think that if 
mother has to work eight hours a day and put the child 
in a day care center then we have an alternative to have 
the father take care of the child that is where it ought 
to be. If there is no problem with the father and there 
is no problem with the father. He is a good provider a 
good caretaker and has a stable environment, (sic) (R. 
357) 
Again, the trial court ignored the fact that it would be the 
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stepmother who would be providing the care [for the child, not the 
defendant, the father of the child. It was 
task to decide custody between the natural mother and the 
stepmother; yet, that is what the court aq 
It, for all intents and purposes, awarded 
not the trial court's 
tually accomplished, 
custody of the minor 
child to the stepmother of the child, not thje father of the child, 
thereby penalizing the mother of the child 
force on full-time basis and finding that i| 
any mother and day care center to provide a 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistenj 
awards should not be disturbed unless there appears to be a 
substantial reason for doing so. In Trego v. Trego, 565 P.2d 74, 
for entering the work 
t is not possible for 
Stable environment, 
tly held that custody 
(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Notwithstanding the desires and contentions of the 
parties, the welfare of the children i| 
consideration of the courts, and where 
determined, and the children appear to 
well adjusted and happy, they should not be compelled to 
change their home unless there appears 
reason for doing so. 
s the paramount 
custody has been 
be comparatively 
some substantial 
There was no substantial reason for changing the award of 
custody in the instant case. The trial court relied upon changes 
of circumstance which are not valid and then used those same 
changes of circumstance as justifications for awarding the 
physical care, custody and control of th& minor child to the 
defendant. The trial court failed to find that the child was 
harmed or affected in any way by his enrollment in full-time day 
care, failed to demonstrate why the day car^ center environment 
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was unstable, and, by awarding the child to the defendant, 
actually awarded the child to the stepmother and penalized the 
plaintiff for her decision to enter the work force full-time. The 
trial court's award of physical care, custody, and control of the 
child to defendant was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, IN MODIFYING THE 
AWARD OF CHILD CUSTODY, IT RULED THAT DEFENDANT SHOULD 
PAY PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $250.00 PER MONTH DURING THE 
THREE-MONTH SUMMER VISITATION AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF. 
Because the trial court should not have disturbed the 
previous award of child custody to the plaintiff, it should have 
more fully considered plaintiff's counter petition for an increase 
in child support and awarded the plaintiff a substantially 
increased amount of child support on a twelve-month basis. The 
trial court made no finding as to why it chose the sum of $250.00 
for child support to be paid to plaintiff during the three-month 
summer visitation, failing to relate this sum to the defendant's 
income, as found in his financial declaration. The court merely 
indicated that this sum 
may seem a little exorbitant, but it is certainly not 
exorbitant. When you consider the difference in the 
earning capacity, when you consider the fact that where 
she is going to have that kind of visitation, plus 
weekend visitations, and she is going to need a little 
extra money to provide some of the needs for the child 
during those three month periods and for weekend 
visitations, this is not exorbitant, (sic) (R. 321) 
The court also noted that it "sort of took" the federal and 
state tax exemptions into consideration when it raised the child 
support to $250.00 for the three summer months of visitation. (R. 
30 
324) 
The trial court again failed to adequately substantiate its 
eclaration filed by 
ross monthly income of 
Inly afford to pay more 
month, for the support 
findings in this case. The financial dk 
defendant at the time of trial indicated a gi 
$2,630.00. (R. 142) Defendant could certai|i 
than $150.00 per month, or even $250.00 per 
of his child. The trial court failed to make any finding 
regarding the comparative incomes of the parties, only noting, as 
above, that there was a difference in the earning capacity of the 
parties. 
Upon remand and reconsideration, whilch is the plaintiff's 
trial court should be 
is Counter Petition to 
requested relief regarding this issue, the 
instructed to fully consider the plaintiff 
Modify and to enter complete findings of fabt as to its award of 
increased child support to be paid by defendant. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
AWARD OF ALIMONY FOR REVIEW IN ONE YEAR I 
The trial court, although it did not alter the award of 
alimony, set the issue of alimony for 
indicating that 
SET THE PREVIOUS 
review in one year, 
[a]fter one year I will give consideration to cutting 
alimony off because I don't think thisi is a situation 
that requires alimony to go on forever.i As a matter of 
fact the trend is away from alimony andi only in 20 per 
cent of the cases across the nation is alimony ever 
awarded anymore. I suppose it is getting less. Utah is 
no different than the national trend I am advised. 
Yet again, the trial court failed to make any specific 
findings regarding this issue. Specifically, the court found no 
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change of circumstances, other than alleged national trends, which 
would justify a reconsideration of the previous alimony award. 
Defendant also failed in his proffered testimony to offer any 
change of circumstances which would justify the reduction of 
alimony; an allusion to the defendant's financial declaration was 
his only attempt to establish any changes of circumstances worthy 
of eliminating the award of alimony to plaintiff. (R. 313) There 
was clearly no reason to set a review regarding the award of 
alimony and this review should be stricken. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
AWARDED THE 1987 AND 1988 FEDERAL AND STATE 
INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE MINOR CHILD TO 
DEFENDANT. 
The trial court ruled that the defendant should be allowed 
both the 1987 and 1988 federal and state income tax exemptions for 
the minor child, finding that defendant would be "in primary 
custody at the end of 1987 and for the bulk of 1988." (R. 321) 
When questioned several minutes later by plaintiff's counsel, who 
reminded the court that plaintiff had been the primary custodian 
for most of the present year (1987) and that the defendant had 
only been paying $150.00 per month (which would be a total of 
$1,800.00 for a twelve-month year), the court, nevertheless, noted 
that defendant "had the child a good deal of the time during 1987 
and from a tax standpoint it is going to make considerable 
difference with him as he would be in a much higher tax bracket 
than she is." (R. 323-324) This is contrary to the defendant's 
own proffered testimony, which indicated that during 1987 
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defendant had only his normal visitation wi 
as several other miscellaneous weeks. (R. 273) By no stretch of 
the imagination did the defendant have thej 
the time during 1987. Of course, as 1988 prt 
currently residing with plaintiff and woi 
defendant on a full-time basis if this Couift were to uphold the 
trial court's custody decision. 
th the child, as well 
child a good deal of 
bgresses, the child is 
uld only reside with 
In the November 6, 1987 hearing the 
meaning to the term "primary care provider." 
attempted again to clarify with the cour 
trial court gave new 
Plaintiff1s attorney 
ft which party should 
receive the 1987 tax exemptions. When the court stated that 
provider in 1987," 
to which the court 
support for the minor 
defendant "still was the primary care 
plaintiff's counsel asked, "Time-wise?" 
replied, "Dollar-wise." (R. 348) Even under this new "primary 
care provider" standard, at $150.00 per montl^ , defendant could not 
have possibly provided the primary financial 
child of the parties. The trial court provided him with an almost 
dollar-for-dollar tax benefit. 
Clearly, the trial court erred in making this determination 
of the award of the 1987 tax exemptions and these exemptions 
should have been awarded to plaintiff. The 1988 tax exemptions 
should, as clearly, be awarded to plaintiff i 
the trial court's custody decision, as she wo| 
the majority of the minor child's support. 
f this Court reverses 
uld then be providing 
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CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The individual aspects of the relief sought are by-products 
of the requested reversal of the trial court's award of joint 
custody to the two parties, with actual physical care, custody and 
control to the defendant. More specifically, plaintiff seeks the 
following: 
1. Child Custody: a reversal of the Order modifying the 
child custody arrangement. Plaintiff seeks a return to the 
original award of care, custody and control of the minor child to 
herself, which would be a reversal of the trial court's award of 
joint custody to both parties, with actual physical care, custody 
and control awarded to defendant. 
2. Review: a reversal of the Order scheduling a review for 
October 13, 1988 before the trial court regarding the issues of 
child custody and alimony. If care, custody and control of the 
minor child are returned to plaintiff, no review would be 
necessary. As there was no evidence offered regarding a change of 
circumstances with respect to alimony, and there was not, indeed, 
any such change of circumstances, no review of the original 
alimony award would be necessary. 
3. Child Support: a reversal of the Order modifying the 
previous child support award. Plaintiff seeks a return to the 
original award of year-round child support and an increase in 
child support based upon defendant's ability to pay. This would 
be a reversal of the trial court's award of child support in the 
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increased amount of $250.00 for only the thbee summer months when 
plaintiff has the actual physical care, custody, and control of 
the minor child. Defendant can certainly 
per month year-round and can, most likely, pis 
4. Visitation: a reversal of the 
original visitation schedule. Plaintiff s| 
original visitation schedule, in which d< 
custodial parent and had the same visital 
afford to pay $250.00 
ay substantially more. 
Order modifying the 
^eks a return to the 
efendant was the non 
tion privileges that 
plaintiff has now been awarded by the trial court. 
5. Tax Exemptions: a reversal of the Order modifying the 
decree of divorce. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1987 and 1988 
federal and state tax exemptions for the mi|nor child, as well as 
all future exemptions. No one-year review ^hould be necessary on 
this issue. 
6. Attorneyfs Fees: an award of attorney's fees and costs 
to plaintiff to be paid by defendant for plaintiff's attorney's 
benefit. Plaintiff does not have the financial resources to pay 
her attorney's fees and costs in this appeal, yet she has been 
forced to incur such fees and costs to pursbe her rights in this 
matter. Plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to find the 
trial court's award of joint custody to the parties, with physical 
care, custody and control to the defendant, 
the court's other rulings regarding child sk 
erroneous, as well as 
upport, alimony, and 
federal and state income tax exemptions. Plaintiff also 
respectfully urges this Court to award her reasonable attorney's 
35 
fees which she has incurred in this appeal process. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 1988. 
CLAUDIA L A Y C O C K C J ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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UT 84102 and four true and accurate copies to Wayne B. Watson, 
Attorney at Law, 2696 North University, Suite 220, Provo, UT 
84604, postage prepaid, this 12th day of February, 1988. 
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK ( , 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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